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Locke Against Himself: The Case For ReEvaluating the “Lockean” Concept of
Personal Identity
Ben Larson
John Locke, when it comes to questions about
personal identity, is chiefly concerned with how we
determine who we hold responsible for actions
deserving of praise and punishment. That is to ask,
how do we determine the identities of “people,” so that
they may own the actions they’ve done in the past?
Locke uses memory as the definition of personal
identity in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
yet his recipe for building a person—found in his work
entitled Some Thoughts Concerning Education—gives
us a different picture. In fact, Locke’s real perspective
on personal identity may be much closer to that of the
contemporary philosopher Derek Parfit, an advocate of
a broader view. An arrival at this conclusion is
dependant on understanding the Lockean definitions of
person and personal identity, and his writings on
education. One must also understand the origins of
Parfit’s theory of personal identity, and how it works.
Finally, the argument that Locke misrepresents his real
view of personal identity in An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding will take two forms, both
stemming from his work on educating children. First,
Locke believes essential character traits make up a
person. Second, contrary to the caricature of Locke as a
purely nurture-centric, he believes in innate
characteristics, and these must contribute to a person’s
identity.
These arguments will demonstrate that
Locke’s view of personal identity can no longer be
viewed in terms of accepted definitions involving
memory alone.
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I
We must take care to differentiate between “a
person” and “personal identity.” A person, according to
Locke, is “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason
and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same
thinking thing, in different times and places; which it
does by that consciousness which is inseparable from
thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it.”1 To be
recognized as a person, you must make it beyond
simply being a member of the human species. You
must be rational, and capable of abstract thought in
some form. Personal identity, on the other hand, is
jargon for verifying that a person, from one day to the
next, is the same person. For Locke, we determine
personal identity by “the sameness of a rational being;
and as far as this consciousness can be extended
backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches
the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was
then; and it is by the same self with this present one that
now reflects on it, that the action was done.”2 This
traditional definition can be captured in one word:
memory. If a person remembers doing an action, he is
the same person who perpetrated that action. If he can’t
be made to remember it, he is not. This is, at least, the
view Locke presents in An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding. We shall see that his true belief is not
so clear cut.

1

Locke Human Understanding II.27.9 (reprinted in Schick and
Vaughn 282, emphasis added).
2
Ibid (emphasis added).
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Before moving on, let’s briefly examine the
implications of this memory-driven theory of personal
identity. In a famous thought experiment on the subject,
Derek Parfit writes:
Suppose that a man aged ninety, one of the few
rightful holders of the Nobel Peace Prize, confesses
that it was he who, at the age of twenty, injured a
policeman in a drunken brawl. Though this was a
serious crime, this man may not now deserve to be
punished.3

Locke’s response, if we are to extrapolate from An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, would be,
“You are wrong, Mr. Parfit. This man does indeed
deserve to be punished, because the Nobel peace
laureate is the same person at age ninety that he was at
age twenty. The proof? He remembers committing the
crime. The Nobelist should be punished as if the crime
had been committed yesterday.” On the other hand,
according to Locke’s theory, someone who doesn’t
have a mental record of their crime should not be
convicted. This idea underlies the tendency in our legal
system for passion crimes to receive lighter sentences
than premeditated ones. It also legitimizes the insanity
defense. The implications of this Lockean definition
impact the world both theoretically and practically.
II
Now that we’ve examined Locke’s view of
personal identity and its implications, let’s return to his
definition of a person. Rationality is the key word here.
Since humans do not arrive from the womb with full
rational abilities, they are not Lockean persons. Instead,
“children are the raw material out of which persons are
3

Parfit Reasons and Persons 326 (reprinted in Schick and Vaughn
275).
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made.”4 Because of this, Locke sees education as the
crucial process in which children are taught how to
become persons. This is the classic Lockean nurture
argument, for Locke doesn’t just refer to erudition
when he uses the word “education.” Education
encompasses every aspect of child rearing. 5 Each
physical and mental particular of Locke’s educational
theory is based on the imperative that children must be
taught to live by reason.
The physical part of Locke’s regime is at times
an enlightened version of “that which does not kill you
makes you stronger.” Locke saw youth as the time
when the body could be fortified against harsh
conditions later in life. He encouraged boys6 to play
outside instead of loafing around the house and sitting
by the fire. By playing outside, a boy would “accustom
himself also to heat and cold, shine and rain; all of
which if a man’s body will not endure, it will serve him
very little purpose in this world.”7 Children should be
given very little meat or beer (if any), and should only
be allowed “good dry bread” between meals.8 Locke
even advocated that children wash their feet in cold
water to toughen them up!9
4

Laine 3.
Ibid (note 3).
6
As radical as Locke’s views on education were at the time he was
writing, Gay reminds us that Locke is no modern liberal. For
instance, Locke uses “boy” when referring to a child because he
didn’t consider writing a book on educating female children.
“Locke was, after all, addressing his little book on education to a
gentleman, on the subject of the education of that gentleman’s son
and in the hope that other gentlemen would read it. It never
occurred to him that every child [or any young girl!] should be
educated or that all those to be educated should be educated
alike…as for the poor, they do not appear in Locke’s little book at
all” (Gay 12-13).
7
Locke Education §9.
8
Ibid §15.
9
Ibid §30.
5
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If Locke’s suggestions for the physical
upbringing of children are based on the denial of
sensory comforts and pleasures, his broader mental
strategy is based on children learning to deny all their
unfit desires using reason:
It seems plain to me, that the principle of all virtue
and excellency lies in a power of denying ourselves
the satisfaction of our own desires, where reason
does not authorize them. This power is to be got and
improved by custom, made easy and familiar by an
early practice…children should be used to submit
their desires, and go without their longings, even
from their very cradles.10

Since Locke’s definition of a person hinges on reason,
it’s logical that he would emphasize this cultivation of
reason in child rearing; after all, “The child is the father
to the man.”11 That is, a kid becomes an adult after
enough “person training”—training to use reason
instead of simply caving to his desires.
Every part of education should teach children
rationality. Punishment and reward systems must
strictly follow this criterion. Punishments and rewards,
in a behavioral learning sense, are tools of operant
conditioning. Locke’s end goal for this conditioning
regimen is, again, to teach a child to command his
mental and outward behavior using reason. Some
forms of punishment and reward dangerously subvert
this ultimate goal. For example, if a parent rewards his
child with sweets for some academic feat, the parent is
simply teaching the child to crave sugar. The pupil
doesn’t then study for the love of learning, but simply
for the sensory pleasure of sweets.12 Similarly, if a
10

Ibid §38 (emphasis added).
Gay 11.
12
Locke Education §52-3.
11
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parent wantonly beats his child for a misdemeanor or
failure, there are negative results. The child will hold
the parent in contempt, for children “distinguish early
betwixt passion and reason.” 13 Worse, a child will
behave or study hard only to avoid beatings.14 Any
animal can be motivated to avoid pain, but this fear has
nothing to do with being rational.
Locke recommends praise and shame instead, as
the carrot and stick, respectively:
Children (earlier perhaps than we think) are very
sensible of praise and commendation [and
disapproval].
They find a pleasure in being
esteemed and valued, especially by their parents, and
those whom they depend on. If therefore the father
caress and commend them, when they do well; show
a cold and neglectful countenance to them upon
doing ill…it will in a little time make them sensible
of the difference; and…work more than threats and
blows.15

Not only does this strategy of behavior modification
avoid the pitfalls of whippings and gratuitous material
rewards, it also allows for the ability of the parent to
rationally communicate the reason behind the
reinforcement. A parent might say, “I’m ashamed of
you, son, because of X,” or “I’m proud of you, daughter,
because of Y.” This is an excellent example of the way
Lockean parents should serve as models of rationality
for their children.
Although Locke declares that children are
naturally sensitive to “esteem or disgrace,” he does
13

Ibid §77.
Ibid §48. Although Locke does recommend the rod be used
sparingly (and preferably not at all), he does note that “there is one,
and but one fault, for which, I think, children should be beaten; and
that is obstinacy or rebellion” (Ibid §78).
15
Ibid §57.
14

27

believe parents should take steps to ensure children will
respond to such methods.16 “Agreeable or disagreeable
things should accompany these different states.”17 That
is to say, a child held in the esteem of a father might be
entitled to candies, and might be prone to getting beaten
if his father held him in disgrace. In this way, a child
satisfies his physical desires only by his “state of
reputation;” “the objects of [a child’s] desires are made
assisting to virtue.”18
Locke uses the word “virtue” here to describe
the way a child’s current behavior is regarded by his
parents. But he uses the word over sixty times in Some
Thoughts Concerning Education, with a broader
meaning. It is the most important of four things a father
should take care to instill in his child: virtue, wisdom,
good-breeding, and learning (in that order). 19 An
examination of these traits will unravel Locke’s prior
professed view that personal identity is wholly
dependent on memory. The memory thesis will be
further assailed when the caricature of Locke as a strict
nurturist is discarded.
First, however, we must
understand an opposing view of personal identity: the
Bundle Theory.
III
The Bundle Theory was pioneered by David
Hume. He believed personal identity consisted of
“nothing but a bundle or collection of different
perceptions, which succeed each other with an
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and
movement.”20 Hume rejects any sort of “featureless
16

Ibid §58.
Ibid.
18
Ibid (emphasis added).
19
Ibid §134.
20
Hume 162.
17
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‘I’” that stands apart from the experiences and
perceptions a person has. Try as he might, he could
never “catch [himself] at any time without a
perception;” Hume was always forced to define himself
by “some particular perception or other.” 21 For
instance, if you were to reflect on “who you are,”
perhaps you might say, “I am generous.” This would
presumably be based on your perceptions of past events
in which you acted generously, and not some cosmic
“I” that has the inherent property of generosity.
This theory was expanded upon by Derek Parfit:
According to the Bundle Theory, we can’t explain
either the unity of consciousness at any time, or the
unity of a whole life, by referring to a person.
Instead we must claim that there are long series of
different mental states and events—thoughts,
sensations, and the like—each series being called
one life.22

Parfit agrees with Hume (and Buddhists, incidentally),23
and the implications for his theory of identity are huge.
By declaring that “our beliefs, attitudes, desires, values,
and…actions” 24 are what make up what we call a
distinct person, Parfit suggests it is not “numerical
identity” (being the same body that did X) that dictates
moral responsibility, but “sameness of character” 25
(having the same beliefs, attitudes, desires, values, and
actions as the body that did X). Therefore, since
Parfit’s “Reformed Nobelist” has none of the same
characteristics as the twenty-year-old rascal who
injured the police officer, he would not deserve
21

Ibid.
Parfit Nature of Persons (reprinted in Schick and Vaughn 292).
23
Ibid.
24
Schick and Vaughn 276.
25
Ibid.
22
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punishment, regardless of his memory.
Parfit’s
conception of personal identity is at work when parole
boards re-evaluate the character of an inmate, and in
statues of limitations, which restrict the length of time a
man or woman may be convicted of a crime.26 We can
now see that Parfit’s view competes with the traditional
Lockean view in theory as well as practice.
IV
With a version of the Bundle Theory in mind,
Locke’s four character traits begin to look very
different. Virtue, wisdom, breeding, and learning are
analogous to Parfit’s list of traits that, in a bundle, form
a distinct person. A discussion of each of Locke’s key
characteristics will demonstrate this. First is “virtue,”
which is too broad for Locke to explicitly define.27 It is
likely a combination of manners, morals, and eveything
else the word implies. Locke does note that the path to
virtue must begin with a strong belief in God. 28
Beyond this, one should always be truthful, and good
natured and loving toward others. 29 Moving on to
“wisdom,” Locke instructs a parent to raise his child
with a love of truth and “worthy thoughts,” and an
aversion to cunning and deceit. 30
Time and
socialization will take care of the rest. “Goodbreeding,” the third quality, is simply the opposite of
two ill qualities: “sheepish bashfulness; and…a
misbecoming negligence and disrespect in our
carriage.”31 These can be avoided simply by caring for

26

Ibid.
Locke Education §139.
28
Ibid §136.
29
Ibid §139.
30
Ibid §140.
31
Ibid §141.
27
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oneself and others, respectively. 32 Locke places
“learning” last, because he believes the preceding
attributes will make learning fall into place quite
smoothly.33 All four traits could easily be construed as
versions of Parfitian beliefs, attitudes, desires, and
values.
We are left with Locke against Locke. His
writings on education apparently contradict his writings
on human understanding. In the latter, he clearly
argues that personal identity is based on the faculty of
memory. An individual is responsible for what he or
she can remember doing. In his pedagogical writings,
however, we see a much more complicated picture of
personal identity. A Lockean person has many traits,
and the goal of education is to cultivate certain
desirable qualities. Locke implicitly argues that a
person is defined in some way by these traits. In any
case, it has been demonstrated that Locke’s view of
personal identity is more intricate than he lets in on An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
V
To complicate things further, Some Thoughts
Concerning Education undermines the simplistic view
of Locke as a puritanical nurturist, adding to the case
against his belief in a theory of personal identity based
on memory alone. Most government classes paint
Locke as “that Blank Slate guy,” and Locke certainly
believes humans are impacted by their environment. If
he didn’t, he would not have written a book on
educating them. However, he is not as radical as he’s
made out to be. Here are Locke’s own words against
the caricature:
32
33

Ibid.
Ibid §147
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We must not hope wholly to change [the] original
tempers [of people], nor make the gay pensive and
grave, nor the melancholy sportive, without spoiling
them. God has stamped certain characters upon
men’s minds, which, like their shapes, may perhaps
be a little mended; but can hardly be totally altered
and transformed into the contrary.34

There are other similar examples. For instance, Locke
states that one tenth of a person’s attributes are innate,
and that education must be suited to developing one’s
“natural genius.” 35 It now appears impossible for
Locke to hold that a person is distinct based on memory
alone, for he has admitted that men have God-given
characteristics. Could a devout man like Locke deny
that a trait handed down from The Almighty is an
integral part of personal identity? It is more likely that
Locke’s real view of personal identity is more complex
than usually assumed.
Did Locke ever arrive at a concise theory of
personal identity for himself? It is unclear. He gives a
straightforward definition in An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding that uses memory as its gold
standard.
But his reflections in Some Thoughts
Concerning Education seem to reject such a simplistic
view of identity. What can be pieced together from
Locke’s pedagogical writings suggest his real view of
personal identity was much closer to Derek Parfit’s
version of the Bundle Theory than his memorial
definition. This is probably a good thing for Locke; as
we saw from Parfit’s thought experiment, the Bundle
Theory does a better job of designating moral
accountability. A person, after all, is a complicated
thing. We should strive to define personal identity in
34
35

Ibid §66 (emphasis added).
Ibid §1.
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broad terms, as Parfit does. Locke, as I have shown,
would probably agree.

33
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